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1. What Must a Loving God Do? 
 
 When we look out at the world, what must we expect to find if it is truly the case 
that a perfectly loving God exists? J. L. Schellenberg has argued that, at a bare minimum, 
we should expect that such a God would ensure that everyone who is capable and open to 
embarking on a personal relationship with God would believe that God exists.1  The 
thought expressed here is that openness to a personal relationship with the beloved 
belongs to the very nature of a loving being.2  Furthermore, it is impossible to be truly 
open to a personal relationship with the beloved if the lover is unwilling for the beloved 
to believe that the lover even exists. Thus, by definition, if God is to be loving, God must 
be willing for all of his human creatures, which are capable and non-resistant to the belief 
in God’s existence, to believe that God is in fact there.3 Moreover, because it belongs to 
the very idea of divine perfection that God also has perfect knowledge and power, God’s 
perfect love would thus not only be necessarily willing to prevent non-resistant non-belief 
in God’s existence, but God’s love would also be able to prevent such unbelief.4   If this 
form of thinking is correct, then it logically follows—just in virtue of an analysis of what 
it would mean for there to be a perfectly loving God—that there must be no such thing as 
humans who are open to forming personal relationships with God, but who fail to believe 
the proposition that God exists.  Perfect love would motivate God to prevent such failures 
of belief in humans non-resistant to personal relationships with God, and perfect 
knowledge and power would enable God to ensure that no such failures of belief occur.5   
If a perfectly loving God exists, then, necessarily, belief in God’s existence is 
evident to anyone cognitively capable and reasonably open to recognizing it. But, 
																																																						
1 I will be drawing principally from two of Schellenberg’s most recent publications explicating and 
defending the argument from hiddenness.  The first is The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New 
Challenge to Belief in God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), and the second is an essay entitled 
“Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” in Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, 
ed. Adam Green and Eleonore Stump (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 13-32.  Although a 
more popular recounting, The Hiddenness Argument has the virtue of displaying very clearly the logical 
structure of Schellenberg’s argument and his primary strategies for supporting its premises. “Divine 
Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” on the other hand, provides a more detailed clarification of the 
argument in the face of the interpretations and objections put forward by his most influential critics.   
2 Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 38-51.  
3 Ibid., 52-53.  
4 Ibid., 45, 57. 
5 Ibid., 56-73. 
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Schellenberg observes, that is not what we find when we look at the world. Instead, we 
find many instances of human beings who are not (or were not) resistant to forming the 
belief that God exists, but who nevertheless are (or were) unable to believe that God 
exists or that he is open to a relationship with them.  Some such people would very much 
like to believe that God exists and desires a relationship with them, but simply cannot 
genuinely and honestly come to form that belief.6  God remains hidden to them.  Others 
in human history—including our earliest ancestors in human pre-history—have lacked 
the requisite cultural and religious infrastructure, training, or background to so much as 
conceive of the existence of a personal and perfect divine being who desires relationship 
with them.  Such people would not have even had the wherewithal to desire relationship 
with God or recognize God as hidden.  Having literally no conception of a perfectly 
loving divine being, they therefore could not have knowingly resisted an open 
relationship with that being. Still, we can assume that many such people, if they could 
have formed the relevant conception of God, would have desired relationship with God. 
But these facts of divine hiddenness violate what we must expect to find if there really 
were such a thing as a perfectly loving God.  Given the existence of divine hiddenness, 
we are logically forced to conclude that such a God does not exist.7  But if God is 
supposed to be essentially loving, then the non-existence of a loving God entails simply 
that there is no God.8  
In putting forth this atheistic argument from the hiddenness of God’s existence,9 
Schellenberg is careful to distinguish it from the atheistic argument from evil.  The 
problem of divine hiddenness, he notes, is not merely a version of the problem of evil, 
since it does not require us to think of God’s hiddenness as bad.10  The phenomenon of 
non-resistant non-belief in God’s existence is not cited as a barrier to belief in God 
because it is an evil that God ought to prevent.  Rather, the phenomenon of non-resistant 
non-belief is a barrier to belief in God because its existence is logically incompatible with 
a divine attribute—love—that God is supposed to have essentially.  Moreover, it is 
precisely divine love, and not divine goodness or power or knowledge that generates the 
problem.  Whereas divine goodness or benevolence, for example, aims at the well-being 
of others, divine love is aimed at a mutual conscious awareness of others in personal 
interactive relationship with them.11  In other words, the demands of divine love include 
not merely a pursuit of our highest good, but also a divine pursuit of fellowship or 
																																																						
6 Ibid., 74-86. 
7 Ibid., 86-88.   
8 Ibid., 102-103.   
9 For a more formal presentation with numbered premises and the conclusions that follow from them, see 
ibid., 103; and Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” 24-25. 
10 Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 28-31.  
11 Ibid., 38.   
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communion with us, and it is that demand that Schellenberg takes to be logically or 
conceptually inconsistent with non-resistant non-belief.   
 
Despite the fact that Schellenberg’s argument is distinct from the traditional 
problem of evil, it nevertheless bears a striking structural resemblance to the deductive 
formulation of that problem.12 Both purport to be deductive arguments to the conclusion 
that God does not exist.  Both are predicated on a conceptual analysis of divine attributes 
combined with an empirical premise that is taken to be logically inconsistent with that 
analysis.  Both, that is, take the following form: 
 
1. If God exists, God is essentially F 
2. If God is essentially F then, necessarily, P 
3. Not-P 
4. Therefore, God is not essentially F (from 2 & 3) 
5. Therefore, God does not exist (from 1 & 4) 
  
Premise 1 specifies some essential attribute(s) F of God.  In the problem of evil F 
is divine goodness, power, and knowledge, whereas in the problem of hiddenness F is 
divine love.  The second premise is a conceptual analysis of F, which claims that there is 
some empirical fact P that is entailed by F, some state of affairs that necessarily follows 
from F. As Alvin Plantinga shows in God Freedom and Evil, the classical formulation of 
the problem is only made fully deductive once this premise is made explicit.13 Once it is 
made explicit, the deductive or “logical” problem of evil can be seen to claim that if God 
is essentially perfect in knowledge, power, and goodness, then, necessarily, evil would 
not exist.  On Schellenberg’s argument, this premise is explicitly spelled out, but in terms 
of the claim that perfect love is necessarily open to personal relationship and that 
openness to personal relationship necessarily precludes non-resistant non-belief.  Thus, 
Schellenberg’s claim is that if God is essentially perfect in love, then, necessarily, non-
resistant non-believers would not exist.   
It is only once we get to premise 3 that we have moved out of conceptual analysis 
of what would necessarily follow if God were F and into the empirical territory of what is 
in fact the case.  In the logical problem of evil, the empirical claim not-P in premise 3 is 
that it is not the case that no evil exists (i.e., evil exists), whereas for Schellenberg, the 
premise not-P is that it is not the case that there is no non-resistant non-belief (i.e. there 
																																																						
12 Michael Rea and Michael Murray also point out the parity of Schellenberg’s current argument with the 
logical problem of evil. See Michael J. Murray and Michael C. Rea, An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Religion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 182. 
13 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 12-23. 
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are non-resistant non-believers).  But if God having the relevant essential attribute 
necessarily requires there is no evil or there is no non-resistant non-belief (premise 2), 
then finding some evil or some non-resistant non-believers logically entails the 
conclusion 4, that God does not have an essential or defining attribute F; on the problem 
of evil this means that God does not have perfect knowledge, power, and goodness, 
whereas on the problem of hiddenness the entailment is that God is not perfectly loving. 
But since (according to premise 1) these are essential attributes of God, God lacking the 
relevant property logically entails the stronger conclusion in 5, that God does not exist.14   
The deductive validity of the argument therefore depends on the inconsistency of 
that empirical claim with a necessary truth about God given in premise 2.  Schellenberg 
appears to recognize this fact in his most recent formulation of the problem in The 
Hiddenness Argument.  There he says that from the premise that “a loving God would not 
permit nonresistant non-belief, it deductively follows that there are no goods, known or 
unknown, such that for their sake God might do so.”15 A charitable reading requires us to 
suppose that what Schellenberg means is not that a loving God merely would not permit 
non-resistant non-belief, but that he could not.  If permitting non-resistant non-belief 
were something God merely would not do, as a matter of what we have reason to believe 
God is disposed or inclined to do, given some things we take ourselves to know about 
God, then we might be able to come up with some further considerations about God or 
some possible scenarios in which we could imagine God in fact permitting non-resistant 
non-belief for some reason that does not impugn God’s perfect love.  Even if it is 
unlikely for God to permit it, maybe he could—just as we might say that Mother Theresa 
would not eat a baby, but she could.  There is a possible world in which she does, but it is 
just an extremely remote possible world.   
If Schellenberg similarly has in mind, not that God remaining hidden from non-
resistant non-believers is a conceptual or logical impossibility, but rather that what we 
can know of God makes the likelihood of remaining hidden vanishingly small, then 
premise 2 in the above argument would have to be revised.  Instead of affirming the 
																																																						
14 Cf. Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 103; and “Divine Hiddenness,” 25.  Michael Rea has 
pointed out to me in private correspondence that, although the argument as Schellenberg currently defends 
it takes the form of the deductive problem of evil, his earlier formulation in Divine Hiddenness and Human 
Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) claims that the problem of hiddenness is a “special 
instance of the empirical problem of evil” (p. 9, emphasis original). There Schellenberg appeals to the fact 
identified by the empirical premise—that non-resistant non-believers exist—as a phenomenon that is both 
an evil and one that gives us sufficient reason to suppose that God probably does not exist.  This 
formulation of the problem more nearly approximates an evidential problem of hiddenness.  However, 
there is also an existential problem of hiddenness consisting in God’s permitting us to undergo a subjective 
condition that is bad for our relationship with God. This paper does not seek to address the evidential or 
existential problems, but in subsequent work I will aim to extend the defense I outline here to address them 
as well. 
15 Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 111. 
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impossibility of non-resistant non-belief, it would have to say, “If God is essentially 
loving, then possibly there is no non-resistant non-belief” or “If God is essentially loving, 
then there is likely no non-resistant non-belief.”  But on any such revision we would no 
longer have a deductively valid argument. Even if an essentially loving God permits 
something unlikely, given what we know or can know about divine love, it does not 
follow that God is not essentially loving or that God does not exist.  We should therefore 
suppose that Schellenberg instead wants us to read premise 2 with the full force of 
conceptual, logical, or metaphysical necessity in place.16  If God is essentially loving, 
then non-resistant non-belief is impossible.   
Making explicit this formal parallel between the logical problem of evil and 
Schellenberg’s logical problem of divine hiddenness provides a helpful way of 
identifying the appropriate strategy for responding to the argument.  The parallel should 
call to mind the strategy for undermining the logical problem of evil made famous by 
Plantinga’s treatment of it in God, Freedom and Evil.  Plantinga pointed out that in order 
to show that premise 2 is false, and thus that the deductive argument fails, all we need to 
do is undermine its strong modal claim that P is a necessary consequence of God’s being 
essentially F.  To do that, it is sufficient to adduce a scenario on which P is possible for a 
God who is essentially F, however remote the possibility might be.  Provided that the 
imagined scenario includes a plausibly coherent possibility that P, we will have a defeater 
for the claim of premise 2 that P is impossible. Thus, with respect to the logical problem 
of evil, premise 2 would require that if God is essentially perfectly wise, powerful, and 
good, then necessarily, no evil exists.  But since this entails that there is no possible 
reason that a God who is essentially perfectly wise, powerful, and good might permit any 
evil, showing that it is false is as simple as offering a counter-example—a plausibly 
coherent scenario in which an essentially perfectly wise, powerful, and good God 
possesses a sufficient reason to permit an instance of evil.  Plantinga suggests that a 
divine interest in human free will is one possible such reason.  He is careful to identify 
this scenario as supplying us with a “defense” rather than a “theodicy” because he does 
not purport to show that the divine interest in promoting human free will is the actual 
reason a perfectly wise, powerful, and good God in fact permits evil, or even a likely 
reason that God permits evil.  He only purports to show that it is a possible reason.17  But 
if it is so much as possible, then premise 2 of the deductive argument from evil is false 
																																																						
16 It will not much matter for the purposes of my argument what sort of necessity is involved here, only that 
the state of affairs I posit as a defense can be plausibly regarded as possible in the corresponding sense. 
17 Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 28-29. 
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and the argument fails.18  
Given the formal parity between the logical problem of evil and Schellenberg’s 
problem of hiddenness, a Plantingian defense should likewise be sufficient to undercut 
Schellenberg’s argument.  If we can cite a merely possible scenario in which God 
remains in the relevant sense essentially perfectly loving while nevertheless failing to 
ensure, for every non-resistant finite person S capable of personal relationship with God, 
that S believes the proposition that God exists, then premise 2 comes out false and the 
atheistic conclusion does not follow.  Moreover, as was the case with respect to the 
logical problem of evil, the relevant counter-example need not mark out any actual state 
of affairs, only a possible one.  Many, perhaps most, of the proposed responses to 
Schellenberg that theists have formulated can be plausibly interpreted as Plantingian 
defenses.19  We can read them as possible counter-examples to Schellenberg’s claim that 
a perfectly loving God must not permit non-resistant non-belief, which purport to offer 
scenarios on which a perfectly loving God could possibly permit non-resistant non-belief.  
My aim in this paper is to add another Plantingian defense onto the heap, but one of a 
different sort than is typically given.  
 
2. What Might a Loving God Do? 
 
Recall that the argument from hiddenness specifies premises 1 and 2 of the 
argument schema above in the following way, which I will call H1 and H2:   
 
H1: If God exists, then God is essentially perfectly loving. 
 
H2: If God is essentially perfectly loving, then, necessarily non-resistant non-
belief does not exist.  
 
We saw that the kind of necessity involved in H2 is supposed to be a conceptual, logical, 
																																																						
18 Or, at any rate, it is defused by shifting the burden of proof back onto the atheist to demonstrate that there 
is something about God’s being essentially F that entails the impossibility of P despite the counter-example 
offered by the Plantingian Defender.   
19 Thus, for example, while the contributors of Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, ed. Daniel Howard-Synder 
and Paul K. Moser (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) take themselves to be responding 
primarily to an evidential rather than logical problem, they all offer some defense of the compatibility of 
divine love with the existence of non-resistant non-belief. Michael Murray offers a free will defense (p. 63), 
while Laura Garcia (p. 95), William Wainwright (p. 115), and Paul Moser (p. 145) all hold that hiddenness 
is compatible with an essentially loving God’s general plan for the world.  In reckoning with 
Schellenberg’s explicit argument for the incompatibility of divine love with the existence of non-resistant 
non-belief, many of the contributors to the more recent Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief (e.g., Moser, 
Howard-Snyder, and Green) likewise attempt to adduce some plausible scenario in which perfect divine 
love possibly co-exists with non-resistant non-belief.   
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or metaphysical necessity, derived from the very meaning of being essentially perfectly 
loving.  So on what analysis of “perfectly loving” can Schellenberg claim that perfect 
love excludes the existence of non-resistant non-belief in the lover?  Schellenberg derives 
this analysis by looking, first, at what he supposes love must involve, and then, adding to 
this his analysis, what perfect love must involve. He holds the following three claims L1-
L3 about the nature of love relationships between any lover S1 and a beloved S2: 
 
L1. S1 loves S2 only if, when morally and metaphysically possible, S1 is open to 
a personal relationship with S2, where a personal relationship involves valuing, 
desiring, and seeking mutual conscious reciprocal interaction between S1 and 
S2.20 
 
L2.  S1 is open to a personal relationship with S2 only if S1 does whatever is 
morally and metaphysically permissible to ensure that where S2 is capable of a 
personal relationship with S1 and not resistant to it, S2 stands in a state of belief 
in relation to the proposition that S1 exists.21  
 
It follows from this analysis of love that:  
 
L3. S1 loves S2 only if S1 does whatever is morally and metaphysically 
permissible to ensure that where S2 is capable of a personal relationship with S1 
and not resistant to it, S2 stands in a state of belief in relation to the proposition 
that S1 exists. 
 
On Schellenberg’s analysis of what it means for God to be an essentially perfect 
																																																						
20 Schellenberg claims that love requires a minimal kind of valuing, desiring, and seeking to pursue 
personal relationship, and further claims that such seeking “normally requires openness” (“Divine 
Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” 20).  In the case of human love, he acknowledges “possible and 
generally unusual circumstances in which a lover may lack the resources to accommodate the possible 
consequences of openness, that is, to make them consistent with the flourishing of all relevant parties and 
of any relationship that may exist or come to exist between them.  But since God is not such a lover, we 
may ignore this qualification hereafter” (ibid, cf. also 29-30; and The Hiddenness Argument, 49-50).  I have 
accounted for Schellenberg’s qualification of the relatively limited resources of human lovers by simply 
building it into his general analysis of love as constrained by moral and metaphysical resources of the 
lover.  Thus, for human lovers, in some cases it is morally or metaphysically impossible to remain open to 
relationship with the beloved despite valuing, desiring, and seeking to cultivate personal relationship.    
21 His strategy for securing this analysis is to defend the claim that a lover’s failure to do what is morally or 
metaphysically possible to ensure that a beloved believe that the lover exists necessarily belongs to the 
definition of being “not open” to personal relationship.  See “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” 
23, 27; and The Hiddenness Argument, 57.   
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lover, God must love every finite person.22  Since a perfect God must be a lover of every 
finite human person, it follows on the above analysis of love that God satisfies L3 and 
does whatever is metaphysically possible and morally permissible to ensure that every 
finite person capable of entering into a relationship with God and not resistant to God 
actually believes the proposition that God exists.  But ensuring the beloved’s belief in 
God’s existence is both metaphysically possible and morally permissible for a being with 
perfect knowledge and power such as theists think God is.  It necessarily follows, 
therefore, that a being of that sort, who is also essentially perfect in love, would ensure 
that every finite being stands in a state of belief in relation to the proposition that God 
exists.   
From the above analysis of what constitutes a perfectly loving God, it does not 
merely follow that, if such a being exists, there are no such things as non-resistant non-
believers in God’s existence.  Rather, what follows is the stronger claim that there could 
not possibly be any non-resistant non-believers in God’s existence, which is the claim we 
find as the second premise of the argument in H2. If God could possibly love someone 
without being open to relationship with that person (contra L1), or if God could be open 
to relationship with a beloved without doing whatever is morally or metaphysically 
permissible to ensure that the beloved believes in God’s existence (contra L2), then there 
might well be non-resistant non-believers who are nevertheless loved by God, and H2 
comes out false.  So the necessity expressed in H2 derives from the claim that L1 and 
L2—and consequently L3—are necessary conditions for a love relationship. It is this 
necessity of love’s demands that Schellenberg applies to God as an essentially perfect 
lover in order to secure the necessity of H2—such that God being a perfect lover with a 
universal scope, sufficient motive, and infinite resources necessitates that all non-resistant 
humans necessarily come to believe in God’s existence and openness to them.   
We can therefore undermine H2 by undermining either L1 or L2 (or both) as 
necessary conditions for a loving relationship, and we can do that by offering a 
Plantingian possible counter-example to either L1 or L2 (or both).  If we can adduce any 
merely possible instance in which love—even perfect love—might coherently be thought 
to co-exist with a closure to personal relationship or without the lover necessarily having 
to ensure that the beloved believes in that lover’s existence, then L3 would not 
necessarily follow.  But if L3 does not necessarily follow, then H2 would lose the force of 
necessity as well, and Schellenberg’s argument would fail in just the same way that the 
logical problem of evil does. Accordingly, many Plantingian Defenders have pursued the 
route of finding plausibly coherent counterexamples to L1 or L2.   
The Plantingian counterexamples currently offered in the literature on hiddenness 
																																																						
22 Ibid., 40.  [to which of the prior volumes does this refer?] 
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tend to be grounded in a resemblance between God’s love for us and our love for one 
another.  “Perhaps,” Schellenberg supposes, “someone will suggest that God could be 
perfectly loving without perpetual openness to relationship if what it is for God to be 
loving is very different from what it is for us to be loving.  Why should we think that 
ultimate love would be at all like our love?”23  Rather than contemplating the prospects 
for this line of reply, Schellenberg simply dismisses the suggestion as a kind of special 
pleading:  
 
The short answer is that it had better be, since otherwise we have no 
business using that word to refer to it!  A somewhat longer one [would say 
that w]hat it would feel like (to put it crudely) to be God loving, and more 
generally what would happen in God—this might indeed by very different 
from what we find in any finite human case.  But what it means to be 
loving is determined by facts about human language, which link it to 
giving and sharing relationship.  The concept of love is our concept…If so 
then of course what I’ve said applies [to God’s love as well as ours]…If 
not, then…who knows what someone who makes that suggestion [i.e., that 
God is loving] is talking about?24 
 
Likewise, with the notable recent exception of Michael Rea (on which, more in a 
moment), Plantingian Defenders have granted this parity between divine and human love.  
They therefore begin by considering scenarios of human love relationships where it 
seems possible for love to remain non-defective while permitting the beloved’s non-
resistant non-belief in the lover’s existence.  Such instances of hidden human love are 
then applied to the case of hidden divine love in order to undermine the inference in H2.  
Thus, for example, just as there are some possible scenarios involving a human beloved 
and a human lover on which it would be better for the beloved if the knowledge of the 
lover’s existence and openness were hidden, so too there are possible scenarios on which 
it would be better for us if a divine lover withheld knowledge of God’s existence and 
openness from us.  
Defenses that depend on some essential resemblance between the kind of love 
relationship with us to which God is open and the kind of love relationships to which 
humans might be open with one another are what we might call anthropological 
defenses.  They are grounded precisely in those features of divine-human love relations 
that we can likewise adduce from human-human love relations.  So, to cite one influential 
																																																						
23 Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 48. 
24 Ibid., 49. 
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example, Daniel Howard-Snyder has suggested that, just like human love relationships 
can sometimes include short-term expressions of closure to personal relationship (thus 
undermining the necessity of L1 in an analysis of love), so can God’s relationship to us.25 
Schellenberg’s reply to this sort of strategy has been to remind us that where it is 
God who is doing the loving, we have to consider what the perfect love of an ultimate 
creator would require us to expect from God, and accordingly we should suppose that if a 
perfectly loving God had the choice of creating finite persons to whom God could remain 
open and for whom God could ensure non-resistant belief in his existence, and if the 
interests of a loving relationship were better served by doing so, then a perfectly loving 
God would necessarily do so.26  In response, the Plantingian defender might then try to 
double down on the idea that in the human case we are applying to God, the love 
relationship could not be improved, perhaps because in creating, God could not or would 
not set things up to improve the situation or because we can find cases of human love to 
apply to God in which securing the beloved’s belief in the lover’s existence would not 
necessarily be a better or more perfect way to initiate the personal relationship in 
question. 27   
Another example of an anthropological Plantingian defense is Michael Rea’s 
recent argument that perfect love cannot be identified with any maximal or idealized 
version of human love.28  On Rea’s view, perfect love would still require the appropriate 
balancing of another’s interests with one’s own, and sometimes being a perfect lover 
requires that we close ourselves to seeking personal relationship with others for the sake 
of preserving our own personhood.  Appropriating an influential argument of Susan Wolf, 
Rea claims that if “moral sainthood” always demands the sacrifice of one’s own interests 
for the sake of another, then moral saints are not perfect agents, whether they are human 
or divine.29  The love of a perfect agent, therefore, would only seek to be open to 
relationship with non-resistant non-believers if this did not require the sacrifice of that 
agent’s own interests.  But it is at least possible that in some cases there are conflicts 
between God’s pursuit of God’s own projects or interests and remaining open to some 
non-resistant non-believers.  Therefore, as a perfect agent, God possibly prefers to 
																																																						
25 See Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Divine openness and creaturely nonresistant nonbelief,” in Hidden Divinity 
and Religious Belief, 126-38. 
26 Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 45-48; “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” 29-30. 
27 Howard-Snyder pursues responses along these lines in “Divine openness and creaturely nonresistant 
nonbelief,” 134-136. 
28 See Rea, “Divine Love and Personality,” chapter 5 of Divine Hiddenness (Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming).  Subsequent references are to a pre-publication draft, pages 1-33. 
29 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” Journal of Philosophy 79/8 (August, 1982): 419-39; Rea, “Divine Love and 
Personality,” 11-18.   
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preserve God’s own personhood by remaining closed to relationship with such persons.30  
If so, then L1 is false.  Notice, though, that like Howard-Snyder, Rea derives his counter-
example by appealing to possible requirements on the preservation of personhood derived 
from the human case and applied to the divine case.  The love of perfect human persons 
can possibly permit closure to personal relationship, and so too might perfect divine 
personhood.31  
We can imagine Schellenberg responding by claiming that the morally 
permissible conflicts of interest between divine and human persons are constrained by 
what we owe to one another.  Perfect parental love may permit, say, refusing to satisfy 
my child’s interests and well-being when, upon my return from a stressful day at the 
office, I need to rest for a moment alone before commencing to play with her.  But given 
that I have adequate resources and opportunity, and in the absence of any discernible 
benefit she might derive, there are no interests of mine that could morally justify my 
refusing to feed her to the point of her starvation.  Similarly, given the asymmetry of 
power and dependence between God and God’s creatures, and the divine choice whether 
to create any finite beings whose good requires relationship with God or not, it seems as 
if we have better reason than not to regard it as a morally irresponsible defect of a loving 
God to neglect the basic good of God’s creatures for the sake of other divine interests, 
known or unknown.32  And likewise, I am sure that there are strategies that are open to 
																																																						
30 “It is not that having distinct interests, projects that further those interests, and a personality expressive of 
them are necessary conditions on personhood. Rather, the idea is that these things comprise a central aspect 
of who one is, and lacking them is a deficiency that somehow diminishes one’s personhood. If this is right, 
then the view that God is maximally devoted to human welfare is inconsistent with the idea that God is 
genuinely and perfectly personal: it implies that either God is perfect but not really or fully personal, or 
God is personal but importantly deficient as a person” (Rea, “Divine Love and Personhood,” 13-14). 
31 Thus, while Rea attempts to differentiate divine love from human love, the difference turns out to be in 
respect of the idealization of human love, rather than an explication of any difference in the kind of love 
God exhibits from the sort humans exhibit.  Instead,	Rea’s defense appeals to self-preservation in one’s 
projects and interests as a common constraint on both perfect human and perfect divine personhood.  As 
per Wolf, moral sainthood “seems to require either the lack or denial of the existence of an identifiable 
personal self” (Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 424), and this is true, Rea supposes, “regardless of whether the ‘self’ 
in question is human or divine” (Rea, “Divine Love and Personality,” 13).   
32 I owe this line of criticism to Jordan Wessling. See his “Michael Rea on Love and Divine Personality” 
http://analytictheology.fuller.edu/michael-rea-love-divine-personality/ (February 2, 2017). Wessling asks 
us to “[c]onsider a relevantly analogous case were a human accumulates twenty cats, knowing full well that 
he cannot care for them. We would fault him not for occasionally choosing his own interests over the cats 
but for taking them into his care when he knows he hasn’t the resources to meet their most basic needs. 
Such a person hardly loves the cats…Yet here we are, in a world filled with people who seek God with no 
response. Doesn’t this provide some evidence against the existence of a loving God? It’s difficult to 
confidently answer ‘no.’”   
The stronger response available to Schellenberg is just that the problem of moral sainthood in the 
context of moral obligations to dependents necessarily demands one’s failure to meet one’s moral 
obligations to both oneself and to one’s dependents.  Avoiding the introduction of a deficiency in one’s 
personhood in such situations requires settling the dilemma by preferring to satisfy one’s obligation to 
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Rea to reply.   
But surprisingly few Plantingian defenders have attempted to show that L1 or L2 
fail, not on the basis of what a perfectly loving divine person might have in common with 
any instances of human loving persons, but rather on the basis of what differentiates 
divine personal love from human personal love.  This would be to give a properly 
theological Plantingian defense rather than an anthropological one.  A theological 
Plantingian defense aims to adduce a possible scenario that undercuts the alleged 
necessity about love claimed by L1 or L2, but the grounds for the relevant 
counterexample are not derived by generalizing from the case of human personal 
relationships and applying what we find there to the divine case.  Instead, I will grant that 
it might well be the case with respect to human love that such love necessitates openness 
to personal relationship with the beloved and, further, that such an openness necessitates 
that the lover ensures that the beloved believes in the lover’s existence.   
My claim, however, is that things stand differently in the case of divine love.  
While I will grant L1 with respect to God, that perfect love necessarily requires some 
kind of expression of openness to personal relationship, I shall deny L2 only in the divine 
case.  Whereas a perfected form of loving relationship that humans enjoy with one 
another might necessitate that the lover always ensures that the beloved believes in the 
lover’s existence whenever morally or metaphysically permissible, the perfected form of 
loving relationship that God enjoys with humans does not require this.  It is at least 
possible that there is a unique kind of personal relationship that can only be initiated and 
sustained with humans by God qua God, wherein God’s openness to personal relationship 
with humans is precisely an openness to this unique sort of personal relationship.  
Further, it is possible that non-resistant non-believers in the proposition that God exists 
can make a start on this kind of personal relationship with God just as well (or, in some 
cases, perhaps better) than can non-resistant believers in God’s existence.  If we can 
																																																																																																																																																																	
oneself over one’s obligation to one’s dependent.  But, ex hypothesi, God is not merely perfect in 
personhood but also an essentially morally perfect person. For a person such as that, a failure to meet a 
genuine moral obligation (even an exculpating failure) is by definition impossible. God must therefore 
refuse to create a world in which God is required to morally fail to meet God’s obligations to finite persons, 
even if doing so has the exculpating justification that it is for the sake of preserving divine personhood.  If 
an essentially morally perfect God who is also perfectly loving exists, there should be no such thing as 
dependents to whom God fails to meet God’s moral obligations, and this includes God’s obligations to 
remain open to those non-resistant non-believers that God creates as objects of divine love. If a perfectly 
moral and loving God chooses to create a world, it must therefore be one without a conflict of interest 
between God’s obligations to Godself and those created for divine love.  Creating a world in which no such 
conflict arises would not thereby make God a merely “opportunistic” saint (contra Rea, “Divine Love and 
Personhood,” 15), because given the moral perfection of the divine nature there would simply be no 
alternative worlds open to God to create.  Nor is this to beg the question against the notion of perfect love, 
but rather to point out that for any person who is both morally perfect and perfectly loving (such as God), 
that person’s moral perfection constrains the ability to express perfect love. 
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describe a scenario on which this is merely possible then we would have a properly 
theological rather than an anthropological Plantingian defense sufficient to undercut the 
hiddenness argument.   
So what type of personal relationship might God uniquely intend for humans, the best 
kind of initiation into which would not necessarily require their belief in God’s existence?  
On at least one possible way of articulating a Christian conception of God’s relationship 
to humanity, given in Genesis 1:26, God creates humanity for the intended purpose of 
imaging God.   In the remainder of the paper, therefore, I will spell out divine image-
bearing as a distinctively divine form of loving relationship that forms the paradigm of 
the conscious reciprocal interactive relationship between God and humans.  I will argue 
that this kind of divine-human love relationship is both distinct from human relationships 
of friendship, spousal love, or parenthood, and that God’s manifesting openness to the 
personal imaging relationship is compatible with permitting the beloved’s non-resistant 
non-belief in God’s existence, whether or not non-resistant non-belief turns out to be 
compatible with any perfected version of those human love relationships.  
 
 
3.  Divine Love as Imaging 
 
 On one reading of the possible world depicted in the Genesis account, God makes 
the whole of the created order and acts as a beneficent ruler over the creaturely domain.33  
God makes the human creature to resemble or mirror God’s beneficent rule over the 
created order.34  In other words, to have a human nature is to be the sort of thing that God 
intends to be in some respect like God in cultivating, nurturing, caring for, and delighting 
in creation.  But humans are still creatures, they are not just little versions of God but 
rather creaturely resemblances of God qua providential ruler.35   It is for this reason that 
God makes humans to exist as a society, because mirroring God’s providential care for 
																																																						
33 Commenting on Genesis 1’s opening line, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth” (1:1, 
Revised Standard Version.  All subsequent biblical translations are taken from the RSV), Bill Arnold notes, 
“There can be no victory enthronement motif because God’s victory was never in doubt; rather God has 
never not been enthroned…he has simply never been less than sovereign.” See Genesis: New Cambridge 
Bible Commentary (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 32. 
34 “Let us make man [sic] in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the 
sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing 
that creeps upon the earth.  So God created man [sic] in his own image, in the image of God he created 
him; male and female he created them” (Genesis 1:26-27).  
35 Arnold again remarks, “The image of God is about the exercise of rulership in the world.  While it may 
be objected that an entire species of humans cannot stand in God’s place as an individual kind, it seems 
likely that the office of God’s representative has been ‘democratized’ in 1:26-27” (Arnold, Genesis, 45). 
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creation confronts creatures with a coordination problem that God does not face.36 It is 
also for this reason that God endows humans with capacities for rational, moral, and 
social growth, because these are necessary capacities for resembling God within 
creaturely limits.   So, at a minimum, God’s relationship to humanity is intended as a 
relationship of inviting something creaturely to resemble something divine.  Imaging in 
this sense therefore exhibits both a kind of symmetric relationship to God and a kind of 
asymmetric relationship to God.  It is symmetrical insofar as humans are persons who, 
like God, are constituted as minds and wills, and like God are capable of employing mind 
and will to serve the best interests of creation.37  But it is asymmetrical insofar as human 
persons are also creatures who depend upon divine judgment to care for creation as God 
cares for it, and insofar as humans are creatures alongside the rest of creation, receiving 
divine care as well as channeling it.38   
 So humans are divine images whose highest good is to so resemble the divine 
mind and will within their creaturely limits, and to do so well rather than badly.  The 
principal way in which God engages humans to cultivate this resemblance relation is by 
way of the goodness and beauty of creation itself.39  As many theologians of the early 
Christian church taught the significance of the creation account, the inherent value of the 
																																																						
36 A ‘democratized’ human rule that approximates God’s care over the whole of the human domain requires 
localization at the site of that rule, and this is why the Genesis narrative issues the command to “Be fruitful 
and multiply, and fill the earth” (1:28) before issuing the command to “subdue” and “exercise dominion” 
over it.   
37 Thus, the depiction of the human as not merely formed from “the dust of the ground” but also as having 
the “breath” of divine life breathed into him (Genesis 2:7).  God is represented as equipping humans for 
their vocation of mediating God’s own rule through granting and guiding powers of mind and will that 
approximate those exhibited by God in creation.  Thus, just as God spoke the world into being, God 
commands Adam to speak the names of the animals, and “whatever the man called every living creature, 
that was its name” (2:19).   
38 The Genesis narrative displays the symmetry of human fellowship with divine rule in naming the animals 
as a kind of cooperation of God’s creative act of speaking and in keeping and tilling the garden on God’s 
behalf (2:14, 19).  It displays the asymmetry of human dependence on God in the requirement God imposes 
on Adam to refrain from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in the center of the garden 
(2:17).  The significance of the prohibition seems to be that the power of creaturely governance God shares 
with humans cannot be exercised according to judgments about good and evil derived autonomously from 
God, but must rather be exercised with recognition that such judgments can come from God alone.  See 
Arnold, Genesis, 59.   
39 This way of reading the significance of God’s self-reflection in the act of creation is a pervasive feature 
of the early Christian theological tradition.  For example, consider the fourth-century church father Gregory 
of Nyssa, expanding on his brother Basil of Caesarea’s commentary on Genesis in “On the Making of 
Man,” trans. Henry Austin Wilson, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, 
vol. 5, second series (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 398: “For since the most beautiful and supreme 
good of all is the Divinity Itself, to which incline all things that have a tendency towards what is beautiful 
and good, we therefore say that the mind, as being in the image of the most beautiful, itself also remains in 
beauty and goodness so long as it partakes as far as is possible in its likeness to the archetype.”  
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world is presented to humans as manifestations of God’s presence to us,40 and such 
manifestations are given to us for our cultivation of divine image-bearing. When we 
respond appropriately to the manifestations of God’s goodness and beauty in creation, we 
thereby partner with God in the formation of our minds and wills to achieve greater 
resemblance to God.41  In doing that, moreover, humans enjoy a kind of communion with 
God, a kind of intimate sharing in the divine mind and will, so that we may come to find 
God uniquely formed within our own individual personhood.42   
Does divine imaging count as a loving personal relationship? It seems to me that 
by Schellenberg’s lights it counts as a personal relationship, insofar as it counts as a 
conscious and reciprocal relationship between a divine and a human agent, and it counts 
as a love relationship insofar as it is one that God values for its own sake.”43  Moreover, 
we can see that it is a relationship in which God values each individual person for their 
own sake, since each individual’s mode of bearing the divine image is the unique way of 
manifesting that person’s humanity.44 It also counts as a kind of love relationship 
according to a traditional analysis on which love involves both union with the beloved 
and the pursuit of the interests or highest goods of the beloved for its own sake.45  
Imaging in this sense thus exhibits a loving personal relationship of love when 
instantiated by God toward humanity.  However, it does not similarly count as an instance 
of love when instantiated by humans in their relationships with one another.  When we 
																																																						
40 Again, Gregory of Nyssa, in “The Second Book against Enoumius (Translation),” trans. Stuart George 
Hall, in Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II, ed. Lenka Karfíková, Scot Douglass, and Johannes 
Zachhuber (Leiden: Brill, 2004), Book II, §§222–24: “And because as the Apostle says, ‘His eternal power 
and divinity is seen, perceived from the creation of the world,’ therefore the whole creation, and above all 
the ordered display in the heavens, by the skill revealed in generated things demonstrates the wisdom of 
their Maker. What he seems to me to want to explain to us is the evidence of visible realities that what 
exists has been wisely and skillfully prepared and abides forever by the power of the Governor of the 
universe. The very heavens themselves, he says, by displaying the wisdom of their Maker, all but utter 
sound as they cry out and proclaim the wisdom of their Designer, though without sound. One may hear 
them instructing us as if in speech, ‘As you look to us, you men, to the beauty and the greatness in us, and 
to this perpetually revolving movement, the orderly and harmonious motion, I always in the same paths and 
invariable, contemplate the one who presides over our design, and through the visible beauty let your mind 
rise to the original and invisible Beauty. For nothing in us is ungoverned or self-moving or self-sufficient, 
but every visible thing about us, every perceptible thing, depends upon the sublime and ineffable Power” 
(107-108).		
41 For a more careful defense of the coherence of this idea, see the account I offer, which is also an attempt 
to retrieve and contemporize the picture I find articulated in Gregory of Nyssa, in Chapter 9 of Sameer 
Yadav, The Problem of Perception and the Perception of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 394-
432.   
42 See Yadav, The Problem of Perception, 449.  
43 Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” 19. 
44 That is, goodness and beauty responsiveness can be both objective and person-dependent. See Yadav, 
Problem of Perception, 424-26. 
45 See Rea’s summary of divine love as willing union with us and desiring our good (“Divine Love and 
Personality,” 5).   
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attempt to reproduce our own image in one another as such, it does not count as seeking 
one another’s highest good, nor as valuing another for her own sake.  God is the only one 
whose mode of agency merits being reproduced in the human person.46 Imaging is 
therefore a uniquely loving personal relationship that is instantiated in God’s love for us.  
It is only instantiated in our love for one another insofar as humans can become divine 
means or vehicles for forming us into the divine image.47  
 The relevant question for Schellenberg’s argument on this picture is whether it is 
possible for God to be open to being imaged in a non-resistant non-believer.  In order to 
be perfectly loving, does God’s openness to imaging the divine self in the human person 
necessarily require God to ensure that the beloved believes that God exists?  Howard-
Snyder observes that it is possible to be aware of a thing de re (i.e., to register its 
presence) without knowing or even believing that you are aware of it de dicto (i.e., 
without being able to conceptually or propositionally identify that which is present to 
you): “You can be aware of Jimmy Carter without being aware that Jimmy Carter is the 
one you are looking at.”48 Similarly, it is possible for humans to be aware of God’s 
presence and agency within creation that calls to us to resemble God in mind and will, 
without being aware that the various manifestations of goodness and beauty in creation 
are God’s call to you. As William Wainwright puts it:  
 
If I don’t believe that God exists, I can’t respond to God under that 
description.  It doesn’t follow that I can’t respond to God.  In the 
Symposium, Plato argues that our response to goods is (or can be) a 
response to the Good.  According to traditional Christianity, however, God 
is the Good.49  
 
Moreover, it is possible to consciously recognize oneself as engaged in moral or 
																																																						
46 As Jesus puts it in Mark 10:18: “Why do you call me good?  No one is good but God alone.” See also 
Augustine, “The Nature of the Good (De Natura Boni),” in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. and trans. J. H. 
S. Burleigh (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 1953), 326-48.   
47 Expressions of human love for one another are thus instances of the love of God “shed abroad in our 
hearts” (Romans 5:5).   
48 Howard-Snyder, “Divine openness and creaturely nonresistant nonbelief,” 138. See also Trent Dougherty 
and Ted Poston, “Divine hiddenness and the nature of belief,” Religious Studies 43/2 (2007): 183-98, 185. 
49 Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and the Hiddenness of God,” in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, 113.  
There is no one way to defend a platonistic conception of creaturely sharing in divine goodness of the sort 
Wainwright here attributes to Edwards. For that conception is not itself a substantive metaphysical thesis 
but rather the consequence of some such thesis.  For various different ways of spelling out and defending a 
metaphysics of value that can accommodate the relevant kind of sharing in divine goodness, see, e.g., 
Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Mark Murphy, God 
and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and 
Yadav, The Problem of Perception and the Experience of God, 393-456.  
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spiritual formation without recognizing that that one is consciously engaged in a 
reciprocal relationship with God.  There can be what Wainwright calls an “extensional 
equivalence” in the conduct and intentions of one’s responsiveness to the manifestations 
of divine goodness and beauty in the world.50  In the early Christian commentary 
tradition, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon were read successively as a 
training manual to move us from a merely de re acquaintance with God via creaturely 
gifts to a de dicto recognition that it is indeed nothing in creation per se, but only God 
who is being formed in our souls by way of our engagements with creation, thus initiating 
a more mature pursuit of intentional relationship with God that is both de re and de 
dicto.51  If it is possible that a perfectly loving God can be open to the personal 
relationship of imaging by way of ensuring for his beloved a merely de re awareness of 
his existence, then L2, and hence H2, would be false.   
 So, on this picture, it is at least possible for God to be open to personal 
relationship with every human without ensuring their belief that God exists.  But we 
might still consider the idea that it would be better if there were no non-resistant non-
believers.  This is just how Schellenberg responds to Plantingian defenses about the 
possibility of divine closure or divine tolerance of non-resistant non-belief.  He suggests 
that since God is the one who set up the world in the first place, a loving God who aims 
at relationship with his human creatures could choose to set it up with no non-resistant 
non-believers in the proposition that God exists—i.e., such that God’s openness to 
personal relationship ensures that no one ever lacks both de dicto and de re awareness of 
God.52  Alternatively, a perfectly loving God could allow for merely de re awareness of 
God’s existence but set things up such that there are no non-resistant non-believers whose 
de re awareness fails to develop into a de dicto awareness of God’s existence.  The idea is 
that since any loving relationship is clearly better served by having both a de dicto and a 
de re awareness of the lover than by having a merely de re awareness, God could not 
create a world that includes for some people a merely de re awareness and still remain a 
perfect lover.53  In that case, divine love manifest as imaging would not prove any 
exception to L2.  
 But we can question the idea that God’s desire for an imaging relationship with 
humans is better served by making a world without any merely de re awareness of God.  
Suppose, for example, that every possible world in which God creates free humans 
																																																						
50 Wainwright, 114.  
51 See Martin Laird, “Under Solomon’s Tutelage: The Education of Desire in the Homilies on the Song of 
Songs,” Modern Theology 18, no. 4 (October 2002): 507-525. 
52 Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 45-46.  
53 The idea is that God should be able to achieve within a relationship characterized by de dicto belief in 
God anything that could be achieved with a merely de re awareness of God.  See Schellenberg, “Divine 
Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” 29.
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involves a Fall from God’s original intention of imaging Godself in humanity.54 Suppose, 
further, that the Fall in question damages human minds and wills in such a way that de 
dicto awareness of God adds nothing to their capacity or inclination to embark upon a 
personal relationship of divine image-bearing with God. That is, a de dicto awareness 
might prove an obstacle for the fallen person’s motivation to move from mere non-
resistance to a reciprocal openness to the God who desires relationship with that fallen 
person.  It might be, for example that, post-lapsum, one must first become seduced by the 
enjoyment of a merely de re encounter with divine self-manifestation under a non-divine 
guise.  That encounter could be better suited to priming the beloved with an appropriate 
kind and degree of asymmetric dependence upon God that would enable her to form a 
proper de dicto belief in God—one that is most conducive to a more intentional pursuit of 
symmetric relationship to God as image-bearer. That is, it might be that an anonymous de 
re personal acquaintance primes one for intimate de dicto personal acquaintance.55 If that 
is a possible state of affairs, then it might be that God’s perfect love for humanity is not 
any better served by a universal de dicto belief in God’s existence.  It still may well be 
the case that ensuring belief in the lover’s existence is a preferable situation in various 
other kinds of personal relationships, like filial love, spousal love, or parental love. But 
that is not necessarily true of the imaging relation, and on a sufficiently well-worked out 
theology of God’s relationship to humanity we can see how L2’s de dicto requirement for 
openness to personal relationship might be false.  It would therefore appear that L2 is 
possibly false in the divine case, and at best merely possibly true. But then we have to 
emend H2 to read, “If God is perfectly loving then, possibly, God ensures that there are 
no non-resistant non-believers.”  But clearly, without the force of necessity in place, the 
empirical premise 3 fails to contradict anything we must expect of divine love, and the 
conclusion that a perfectly loving God does not exist does not follow. 
However, the above reply would only be sufficient to defeat L2, and thus provide 
a Plantingian defense against H2 if a perfectly loving God would not also desire other, 
non-imaging forms of personal relationship that would benefit from there being non-
resistant non-belief in God’s existence de dicto.  So Schellenberg might concede that God 
is open to the uniquely divine loving relationship of imaging but hold that a perfectly 
loving God must also be open to, say, the divine analogue of human filial, spousal, or 
parental love, where these analogues must satisfy L2. After all, the very same scriptural 
witness that leads us to develop the image-bearing possibility also supposes that God 
																																																						
54 See, for example, chapter 7 of Plantinga, God Freedom and Evil, on “transworld depravity,” 49-53. 
55 This is something like the point Howard-Synder makes, but with the crucial difference that “intimate de 
dicto personal acquaintance” is for me cashed out in terms of a conceptual or propositional knowledge of 
God’s imaging in one’s person, not in terms of the kind of intimacy characteristic of human relations of 
parental, filial, or spousal love. 
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wishes to befriend us,56 that God is a jealous lover,57 that God is our heavenly Parent.58  I 
do not think that is a promising line to take, for at least two reasons.  First, there is no 
reason to suppose that a perfectly loving God is under any obligation to love creatures in 
every way it is possible to love creatures, only that God intends some sort of loving 
personal relationship with them.  Second, on the picture I have been presenting, God’s 
desire for union with us and for our highest good are suited to our nature, the kind of 
things we are, as (ex hypothesi) divine image-bearers.  Accordingly, we can hold that it is 
possible that the personal relationship God desires for us is not filial, spousal, or parental 
love, but only imaging love.   
Still, this may not be a terribly satisfying line to take for those espousing the very 
Abrahamic faiths from which an imaging defense derives.  As a proponent of the 
scriptural witness in question, I think a further reply is available, according to which 
these other forms of love are not to be taken literally, but precisely as metaphors for the 
imaging relation.  Speaking particularly about the Hebrew Bible or Christian Old 
Testament, when Scripture uses filial and spousal language to describe God’s love for us, 
it intends to display the symmetric relation between God and us as creaturely 
resemblances of God who thereby enjoy a kind of fellowship, joint attention and 
vocation, and intimate co-naturality with God.59 When Scripture uses parental language 
to describe God’s love for us, it intends to display the asymmetric relationship of 
dependence upon God that belongs to our bearing the divine image.60  So in conveying 
the divine desire for filial, spousal, and parental union with us, God is conveying 
different dimensions of the same divine desire for being imaged in us.   
We might go further and say that inter-human relationships of filial, spousal, and 
parental love are not only means of achieving the creaturely solidarity and cooperation 
required to care for God’s creation in resemblance to God.  They are in fact creaturely 
ways of imaging the image-bearing relation. The Platonists thought that when we desire 
sexual union with a lover, for example, we are just mistaking the immaterial beauty we 
perceive for its material instantiation, and therefore trying to unite with it in the wrong 
																																																						
56 Abraham, we are told, “was called the friend of God” (James 2:23). 
57 “I will betroth you to me forever; I will betroth you to me in righteousness and in justice, in steadfast 
love, and in mercy” (Hosea 2:19).  
58 “Have we not all one Father? Has not God created us?” (Malachi 2:10) and “Father of the fatherless and 
protector of widows is God in his holy habitation” (Psalms 68:5).  
59 Thus, in passages concerned with God as friend or jealous lover, the context reveals that what is at stake 
is covenantal commitment to the peculiar sort of partnership with God’s people in which they display 
God’s justice, mercy, faithfulness and love in care for one another, their fellow creatures, and the 
environment.   
60 Thus, in passages concerned with God as parent, the context reveals that what is at stake is human 
dependence upon divine judgment regarding the parameters of	proper responsiveness to the divine call to 
goodness and beauty, which is mediated in the world.   
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way.61  But maybe the picture is rather that when we engage in any kind of loving human 
relationship, we are engaged in a creaturely analogue of God’s own free desire to be 
reproduced in another.  More radically, perhaps one way that Christians should interpret 
the significance of God’s incarnation as Jesus of Nazareth is to regard him as a creaturely 
analogue of a free divine desire that we be reproduced in God’s image.   
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The suggestion that it is possible to construe God’s love for us strictly as a sui 
generis relation of imaging divine goodness and beauty within us raises important 
questions about its existential and theological viability.  But while important, those 
concerns are immaterial to the primary thesis I have advanced here, which is just that it is 
conceptually, logically, and metaphysically possible that perfect divine love for humanity 
is the kind of love expressed by the relation of divine image-bearing.  If that is so, then 
there might well be non-resistant non-believers to whom God stands in perfect loving 
relations in God’s openness to being imaged in them, whether or not they stand in a state 
of belief with respect to the proposition that God exists, and Schellenberg’s deductive 
argument from hiddenness fails for lack of support of H2.  One of the benefits of taking 
this theological route for a Plantingian defense, as opposed to the anthropological route 
pursued by, for example, Howard-Snyder’s or Rea’s analogies of human closure to 
relationship, is that it offers a principled way of appealing to sameness and difference in 
comparing human agency and personhood to divine agency and personhood.  
On the one hand, we ought to expect that God’s agency and personhood 
transcends the sorts of agency and personhood humans value in our relationships to one 
another, while on the other hand we ought to expect that God’s agency and personhood is 
in some way immanent to what we value in our relationships to one another.  The 
imaging relation satisfies both of these intuitions at once.62   Further, creating space for 
this distinctively theological defense against the problem of hiddenness has the 
																																																						
61 This is the Platonic insight that we found Wainwright observing above from the Symposium. But whereas 
the Platonic picture did not characterize the manifestations of the Good and our engagements with it as 
personal, the particular Christian development of the Platonic picture did.  A theology of divine image-
bearing of the sort I have adumbrated here was precisely the result of that development.   
62 My worry about Rea’s approach in Divine Hiddenness, on the other hand, is precisely that it seems to me 
to satisfy at most one of these intuitions.  For, in his “two pronged” approach, he first argues in chapter 4 
(“Divine Transcendence”) for the thesis that divine love might transcend human love and as a result might 
not be identifiable in terms of our filial, parental, or spousal frameworks for thinking about love.  But it 
seems to me that this functions as a purely negative gesture, without any substantial picture of what it might 
therefore mean for God to have a personally loving relationship with humans.  Then, in chapter 5 (“Divine 
Love and Personality”), he offers his anthropological defense against moral sainthood as an alternative to 
his development of the transcendence intuition, for those who would prefer to bracket the consideration of 
God’s love as categorically different from ours.  The imaging defense, on the other hand, specifies both the 
difference and the sameness that we should expect from the notion of a transcendent and personally loving 
God.   
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unexpected consequence of supplying us with possible reasons to prefer some theisms 
over others.  Those of us who understand divine love in terms of imaging can wield 
Schellenberg’s argument against those theists who characterize divine love strictly in 
terms of human love.  We can use it to argue that if a perfectly loving God exists, either 
that perfectly loving God has made us in the divine image, or else God does not exist for 
just the reasons Schellenberg adduces precisely by relying on an anthropologically 
grounded analysis of divine love.63   
 
																																																						
63 In other words, the replies that I have offered on behalf of Schellenberg against e.g., Howard-Snyder or 
Rea can also be wielded by the Theological Plantingian Defender who advocates an imaging defense 
against all manner of Anthropological Plantingian Defenders.   
